The Role of ICT in Reducing Information Asymmetry for Financial Access by Asongu, Simplice & Moulin, Bertrand
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Role of ICT in Reducing Information
Asymmetry for Financial Access
Simplice Asongu and Bertrand Moulin
January 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/73090/
MPRA Paper No. 73090, posted 15 August 2016 09:14 UTC
 1 
 
A G D I   Working Paper 
 
 
WP/16/008 
 
 
 
The Role of ICT in Reducing Information Asymmetry for Financial Access 
 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu 
African Governance and Development Institute,  
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail: asongusimplice@yahoo.com /asongus@afridev.org   
 
 
Bertrand Moulin 
African Governance and Development Institute  
P.O. Box 8413 Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
E-mail : bertrand.moulin4@gmail.com  
 
 
 
Published: Research in International Business and Finance, 38, (September 2016), pp. 202-213.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
2016 African Governance and Development Institute                                                   WP/16/008 
 
 
AGDI Working Paper 
 
Research Department  
 
The Role of ICT in Reducing Information Asymmetry for Financial Access 
 
 
Simplice  A. Asongu & Bertrand Moulin 
 
 
January 2016 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study assesses the role of ICT in complementing private credit bureaus (PCB) and 
public credit registries (PCR) in reducing information asymmetry for financial access. The 
empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments with 53 African countries for 
the period 2004-2011. The following findings are established. First on financial access: (i) the 
marginal effects from interactions between ICT and PCR (PCB) are consistently positive 
(negative); (ii) net effects from interactions are negative with the higher magnitude from PCR 
and (iii) only thresholds corresponding to interactions between PCR and internet penetration are 
within range. Second, findings on financial allocation efficiency reveal positive marginal and net 
effects exclusively for mobile phones and PCR. Third, allocation efficiency may be constrained 
by increasing financial deposits. Overall, the complementarity between information offices and 
ICT in boosting financial access is still very limited. Policy implications are discussed with 
emphasis on improving the engaged complementarity and fighting surplus liquidity. 
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1. Introduction 
 There are at least four reasons for positioning an inquiry on the role of information and 
communication technology (ICT) in reducing information asymmetry for financial access in 
Africa, notably: (i) the growing need for investment to finance the continent’s growing 
ambitions; (ii) greater scope for ICT penetration; (iii) substantially documented concerns of 
surplus liquidity and scarce literature on financial efficiency and (iv) limited financial access 
owing to information asymmetry.  
 First, the African business literature has been consistent with the need for alternative 
investment sources after failed projects of privatisation over the past decades (Rolfe & 
Woodward, 2004; Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Darley, 2012). 
 Second, the growth potential of ICT in Africa is higher compared to other continents. In 
essence, while high-end markets in Asia, Europe and North America are currently experiencing 
stabilization in the growth of ICT, business opportunities related to mobile phones and the 
internet are sill substantial in Africa (Asongu, 2015a). Furthermore, as maintained by Penard et 
al. (2012), the continent has been witnessing an uneven penetration in the internet, compared to 
the mobile phone. According to the authors, as of 2010, whereas penetrations of the internet and 
the mobile phone had reached points of saturation in developed economies, there was still much 
room for their developments in Africa, notably, with: 9.6% and 41% for internet penetration and 
mobile phone penetration respectively.  
 Third, in response to the concerns about financial inefficiency in African financial 
institutions (see Saxegaard, 2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014a, p.70), the available literature has 
not focused on the fundamental mission of banking institutions which is to transform mobilised 
deposits into credit for economic operators (see Ataullah et al., 2004; Al-Obaidan, 2008; Kiyato, 
2009; Kablan, 2010). Consistent with Asongu and Tchamyou (2015), available measurements of 
financial efficiency that have been employed include: profit efficiency (Hauner & Peiris, 2005); 
cost efficiency (Chen, 2009; Mensah et al., 2012) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for 
technical efficiency (see Kablan, 2009).  
 Fourth, there is an evolving stream of literature maintaining that limited financial access 
has been due to information asymmetry (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2015). In response 
to the policy syndrome, over the past decade, information sharing offices (ISO) or public credit 
registries (PCR) and private credit bureaus (PCB) have been introduced across the continent in 
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an effort to reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking sector
1
. 
In essence, the introduction of ISO has been motivated by the idea that lack of financial access is 
constrained by factors that can be explained by information asymmetry, namely: eligibility to 
bank lending, physical access and affordability (see Batuo & Kupukile, 2010; Allen et al., 2011). 
Apart from serving as brokers between lenders and borrowers in financial institutions, ISO 
improve capital allocation efficiency, mitigate credit constraints and boost market competition 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). In spite of these appeals, recent evidence suggests that: (i) there is 
still excess liquidity in African financial institutions (see Fouda, 2009) and (ii) ISO are having a 
negative effect on financial development on the continent (Asongu et al., 2015). This may not be 
surprising because the nexus between reducing information asymmetry and bank lending has 
remained an open debate in the literature: “On the whole, all three models agree on the 
prediction that information sharing (in one form or another) reduces default rates, whereas the 
prediction concerning its eﬀect on lending is less clear-cut” (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, p. 2020). 
 In the light of the above, the literature on information asymmetry and financial 
development (which is discussed in Section 2) leaves room for improvement in at least three 
areas, notably, the need to: (i) position inquiries on scopes where the issue of financial access is 
very severe; (ii) assess the effect on financial access by engaging the fundamental role of 
financial institutions in transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators and 
(iii) examine the role of ICT in boosting ‘information sharing’ for allocation efficiency.  
 First, with regard to the scope of study, in spite of the substantially documented concerns 
of surplus liquidity in the banking sector of Africa, to the best of our knowledge, scholarly focus 
on addressing the policy syndrome has been limited within the framework of information 
asymmetry. In other words, the continent with one of the most severe issues of  limited access to 
finance has not been thoroughly engaged or given the scholarly attention it deserves.  
Furthermore, studies that have focused on Africa have been limited in scope by focusing on a 
restricted number of countries.  To put this point into perspective: Galindo and Miller (2001) 
have engaged no country on the continent; Love and Mylenko (2003) have focused on four 
countries while Barth et al. (2009) have engaged nine. Whereas Triki and Gajigo (2014) have 
positioned their inquiry on 42 nations for the period 2006-2009, the present study focuses on 53 
African countries for the period 2004-2011. In the light of the above, the scope of this inquiry is 
                                                          
1
 We use ‘PCB and PCR’ interchangeably with ISO throughout the study.   
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motivated by the scarce literature on Africa, in spite of: recommendations for more scholarly 
research on the nexus between ISO and financial access (Singh et al., 2009, p. 13) and evolving 
policy questions about whether the advent of ISO on the continent has been accompanied with 
increasing financial intermediary efficiency and activity (Triki & Gajigo, 2014) 
 Second, ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘financial development’-specific literatures have 
failed to engage the concept of financial development in the light of the fundamental role of 
banking institutions which is to transform mobilised deposits into credit for economic operators. 
On the one hand, both general and African-related information asymmetry and information 
sharing literatures have engaged for the most part, measurements of constraints in financial 
access (see Ivashina, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Tanjung et al., 2010). On the basis that the 
fundamental role of introducing ISO in Africa has been to enhance financial intermediation 
efficiency and activity, we measure financial access as the ability of banks to transform deposits 
in credit. Hence, we measure financial development in terms of financial allocation efficiency 
(credit/deposit ratio) and financial activity (credit) because ISO have been documented to 
enhance competition and reduce informational rents, with anticipated results of higher financial 
activity (lending) and allocation efficiency (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993, p. 2019). 
 On the other hand, in the African financial development literature, the conception and 
definition of financial efficiency has not been tailored towards the fundamental mission of 
financial institutions which is to transform deposits into credit. Consistent with Asongu and 
Tchamyou (2015), two mainstream measurements have been used, notably : (i) DEA to assess 
the efficiency of decision making
2
 and (ii) Overall Economic Efficiency (OEE) within the 
frameworks of technical and scale efficiencies
3
  as well as profitability- and cost-related 
perspectives
4
. We steer clear of this stream of literature by employing a measurement of 
                                                          
2
 We invite the interested reader to refer to Kablan (2009) and Ataullah et al. (2004) who have employed the DEA 
approach in Africa and Pakistan respectively. These authors are concerned with technical and scale efficiencies.   
3
 We also invite the interested reader to consult Al-Obaidan (2008) who employs a composite indicator of banking 
system efficiency to assess the outcome of globalization on technical efficiency.  
4
 This is in line with recent studies on financial efficiency on the continent (see Kablan, 2010; Kiyato, 2009). 
Consistent with Asongu (2013a), four main indicators on financial efficiency are apparent in the literature.  “They 
include: the ratio of bank deposits (which measures the extent to which savings can fund private credit), the net 
interest margin (which is the accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenues as a share of its total assets), 
overhead cost (or the accounting value of the bank’s overhead cost as a share of its total assets) and, cost/income 
ratio (which assesses overhead costs relative to revenues)” (p.665). While the last-three are linked to the concept of 
profitability, the notion of efficiency employed within the framework of this paper is the first.  The interested reader 
may also refer to Demirgüç-Kunt and Beck (2009) for additional insights.  
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financial efficiency that is consistent with the discussed policy syndrome of excess liquidity in 
financial institutions of the continent.  
 Third, in accordance with the narrative above on the growth potential of internet and 
mobile phones in Africa, it is reasonable to assess if this ICT has potential to complement ISO in 
their role of information sharing for better financial intermediation or financial access. The rest 
of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical and theoretical literatures. 
The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents and discuses the findings 
while Section 5 concludes with future directions.  
 
2. Empirical and theoretical underpinnings  
2.1 Information asymmetry and financial development  
 In accordance with Asongu et al. (2015), an abundant supply of information asymmetry 
(hence IA) literature has been oriented towards, the: effect of creditors’ right to more information 
and role of information sharing between creditors. The former has fundamentally focused on the 
influence of consolidated creditors’ rights in among others: bankruptcy (see Djankov et al., 2007; 
Claessens & Klapper, 2005;   Brockman & Unlu, 2009) and risk-taking by financial institutions 
(Acharya et al., 2011; Houston et al., 2010). The latter perspective has focused on examining 
how reduced IA: increases access to finance (see Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Brown et al., 2009; 
Djankov et al., 2007); reduces the cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009); mitigates rate of default 
(Jappelli & Pagano, 2002); influences syndicated bank loans (Tanjung et al., 2010; Ivashina, 
2009); affects corruption in lending (Barth et al., 2009) and impacts antitrust intervention 
(Coccorese, 2012).  
In the light of the above, it is apparent that the engaged literature has focused on 
developed countries and developing nations in which concerns about surplus liquidity in 
financial institutions are comparatively less severe. In a nutshell, as documented by Asongu et al. 
(2015), while the great bulk of the literature has been oriented towards the emerging economies 
of Latin America and Asia on the one hand and the nations within the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation (OECD) on the other hand, the comparative neglect of Africa is a substantial gap in 
the literature. In what follows, we engage studies highlighted in the introduction to motivate this 
inquiry.  
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 Love and Mylenko (2000) have combined public and private credit registries with firm-
related data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey (WBES) to examine linkages 
between enhanced financing sharing by perception managers and banks, credit registries and 
constraints in credit financing. The authors have established that: (i) PCR do not significantly 
bear on mitigating financing constraints and (ii) PCB are linked with higher financing from 
banks and lower financing constraints.  
Galindo and Miller (2001) have provided a macroeconomic perspective and established 
that compared to less developed nations with credit bureaus, developed countries with credit 
registries are endowed with comparatively less restrictions to financial access.  In essence, PCR 
that are well-performing substantially contribute to reduced-sensitivity of firms to investment 
decisions for the availability of cash flows.  The authors further maintain that the performance of 
credit registries has been clouded by a 50% reduction, especially with respect to how internal 
funds affect investment decisions.  
Barth et al. (2009) have used WEBS from 4000 firms in 56 counties and private credit 
from 129 countries to examine linkages between information sharing, lender/borrower 
competition and ‘lending corruption’ to establish two principal findings. First, firms’ and banks’ 
ownership structure, the legal environment and competition by firms substantially influence 
corruption in lending. Second, information sharing plays a crucial role in the negative 
relationship between banking competition and corrupt lending. 
Triki and Gajigo (2014) have investigated the impact of ISO in access to finance by firms 
and the nexus between PCR design and financing constraints. Their findings show that: (i) access 
to finance is comparatively more in economies with PCB, relative to their counterparts with PCR 
or no credit offices and (ii) there is substantial heterogeneity in financial access as well as the 
design of ISO with PCR. 
Asongu et al. (2015) have assessed information sharing policy thresholds for financial 
development and established the following. Both PCR and PCB have negative effects on 
financial depth, with the impact of the former higher in terms of magnitude. Whereas PCB have 
a negative impact of banking system allocation efficiency, the effect of PCR is not significant. 
Both PCR and PCB have negative impacts on financial activity, with the latter having a higher 
magnitude. Both types of credit offices positively affect financial size, with the effect from PCR 
higher in terms of magnitude.  
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2.2 Theoretical underpinnings  
 This section is engaged in two main strands, notably: theoretical underpinnings 
substantiating the nexus between information sharing and financial allocation efficiency on the 
one hand and on the other hand, the intuition for the role of ICT in information sharing for 
financial allocation efficiency.  
 In accordance with Claus and Grimes (2003), two main perspectives exist in the literature 
on the theoretical link between banking institutions and information sharing. Whereas the first 
lays emphasis on the provision of liquidity by banking institutions, the second is focused on the 
ability of banking institutions to transform assets’ risk characteristics. Both strands in the 
literature draw on the fundamental mission of financial intermediation of enhancing allocation 
efficiency through cost reduction and efficient channelling of mobilised resources from lenders 
to borrowers. Related theories on the role of financial intermediaries have built on imperfect 
market information literature. In what follows we briefly engage some foremost authors who are 
consistent on the relevance of information sharing in increasing financial access.  
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have assessed liquidity provision by banks. In their model, 
ex-ante IA derives from the inability of lenders to classify borrowers in relation to their credit 
risks, hence, leading to issues of adverse selection. Conversely, ex-post IA arises when only 
borrowers can observe actual returns from a funded project. This may result in moral hazard if 
borrowers decide to limit compliance with their financial obligations towards corresponding 
lenders/banks. The plethora of theoretical contributions in the economics of IA are broadly 
consistent with the Diamond and Dybvig on the  need for information sharing to improve 
financial allocation efficiency, namely: (i) Leland and Pyle (1977) on the communication of 
information to investors about potential borrowers by banks; (ii) Diamond (1984) on 
diversification within financial intermediaries and (iii) Jaffee and Russell (1976), Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) and Williamson (1986) with models of credit rationing. In essence, above studies 
are broadly consistent with the perspective that the primary mission of financial intermediaries is 
to reduce transaction and information costs arising from IA between lenders and borrowers. 
Therefore, the importance of ISO is consolidated by the need for channels through which 
information sharing can boost financial access.  
 ICT has been recently documented to increase information sharing between market 
participants in various sectors of developing countries. Some advantages have included: reduced 
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marketing cost and increased market participation (Muto & Yamano, 2009, p. 1887) and 
reduction of information asymmetry (Aminuzzaman et al., 2003). In a nutshell, ICT in the 
perspectives of mobile phone and internet penetrations reduce information asymmetry (see  
Andonova, 2006). In the light of the above, the intuition that ICT can complement ISO in the 
reduction of IA for better financial access is sound.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 The study investigates a panel of 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011, with 
data from the Financial Development and Structure Database (FDSD) and African Development 
Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank. The two main financial indicators are from the FDSD. 
Information on ISO is only available from the year 2004 while the latest year in the FDSD is 
2011.  First, financial efficiency is proxied with: (i) banking-system-efficiency (with ‘banking 
system credit’ on ‘banking  system  deposits’) and (ii) financial-system-efficiency (with 
‘financial system credit’ on ‘financial system deposits’). Second, financial activity is measured 
with: (i) banking system activity (with ‘private domestic credit by deposit banks’) and (ii) 
financial system activity (with ‘private credit by deposit banks and other financial institutions’). 
 In accordance with Triki and Gajigo (2014) and Asongu et al. (2015), IA is measured 
with PCB and PCR. There are six distinctive features between PCB and PCR, namely: access, 
status, purpose, coverage, ownership and data sources. For brevity and lack of space, the 
interested reader can have more insights from the two studies motivating the choice of these 
variables.  
 Consistent with the motivation of the inquiry on the growth potential of internet and 
mobile penetrations in Africa (see Penard et al., 2012), ICT is measured with mobile phone and 
internet penetration rates. Six control indicators from recent financial development literature are 
employed to account for omission variable bias, notably: the lagged dependent variable, 
inflation, GDP growth, trade, public investment and foreign aid (Huang, 2005; Osabuohein & 
Efobi, 2013; Asongu, 2014b). A preliminary assessment shows that accounting for more than six 
control variables leads to instrument proliferation (or the number of instruments exceeding the 
number of cross sections). We devote space to discussing expected signs.  
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 First, Do and Levchenko (2004) and Huang and Temple (2005) are supportive of the 
positive influence of trade openness on levels of domestic financial development. Second, the 
positive relationship between investment and financial development has been established by 
Huang (2011). Third, both theoretical (see Huybens & Smith, 1999) and empirical (Boyd et al.,  
2001) literatures are consistent with the view that chaotic inflation is associated with less active, 
less efficient and smaller banks. Fourth, the positive relationship between growth and financial 
development has been substantially documented in the literature (see Saint-Paul, 1992; 
Greenwood & Jovanovic, 1992; Levine, 1997; Asongu, 2015b). In essence, economic growth is 
linked with reduced financial intermediation cost because of inter alia: intensive competition and 
availability of more funds for productive investments. Furthermore, Jaffee and Levonian (2001) 
have established that income levels have a positive influence on banking system structure while 
Asongu (2012) has concluded that higher income countries in Africa are associated with higher 
levels of financial development. Fifth, whereas development assistance is theoretically expected 
to boost financial development because it is  destined to bridge the saving-investment or finance-
investment gap poor countries face (Easterly, 2005), from a practical perspective however, the 
nexus could also be negative for at least a twofold reason: if foreign aid is substantially spent in 
donor nations and/or stolen in recipient countries by corrupt officials are deposited in developed 
countries through tax havens whose politico-economic jurisdictions are controlled by advanced 
economies.  
The definitions and sources of indicators are disclosed in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 
provides the summary statistics whereas the correlation matrix is presented in Appendix 3. From 
the summary statistics, the means of the variables are comparable and the corresponding degree 
of variations is an indication that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The purpose of 
the correlation matrix is to avoid concerns about multicollinearity. After a preliminary 
assessment, concerns about multicollinearity are apparent between financial development 
variables on the one hand and between ICT indicators on the other hand. While the concerns in 
financial development are not very relevant because they are used exclusively as dependent 
variables, the underlying issue in ICT is tackled by using the mobile phone and internet variables 
in distinct specifications.  
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3.2 Methodology 
The study adopts an empirical strategy that is based on two-step Generalised Method 
Moments (GMM) with forward orthogonal deviations instead of differencing. This estimation 
approach is an extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) by Roodman (2009ab). The estimation 
strategy has two main advantages, notably: it restricts instrument proliferation or over-
identification and controls for cross-sectional dependence (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 
2008).  The two basic requirements for the adoption of a GMM approach are satisfied because: 
(i) the number of cross-sections is higher than the number of time series in the cross-sections or 
N(53) > T(8) and (ii) the dependent variables are persistent as apparent in Appendix 4 where the 
coefficients of correlation between the dependent variables and their lagged values are higher 
than the rule of thumb threshold of 0.800.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
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Where: tiFD ,  
 is the financial development (efficiency and activity) of country i
 
at  period t ; is 
a constant;
 
 represents tau ;  ISO , is an information sharing office (PCR or PCB); ICT , 
information and communication technology (mobile phone or internet); Inter , interaction 
between  ISO and ICT;
 
W  is the vector of five control variables  (inflation, public investment, 
GDP growth, trade and foreign aid),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-specific 
constant  and ti ,  the error term.  
 A two-step specification is preferred to the one-step procedure because it is consistent 
with heteroscedasticity. We are also consistent with Brambor et al. (2006) in integrating all 
constitutive terms into the specifications.  
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4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 The empirical exercise is engaged at three levels. We first begin by examining the role of 
ICT on ISO in financial activity. Then the focus is oriented towards financial allocation 
efficiency. Last, we elicit the financial allocation efficiency findings by assessing linkages with 
liquid liabilities or financial system deposits. Specifications are valid if post-estimation 
diagnostic tests are acceptable. To this end, four main information criteria are employed to assess 
the validity of estimated models. First, the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals is 
ascertained by a failure to reject the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond 
autocorrelation test in difference (AR(2)). Second, null hypotheses corresponding to the Hansen 
and Sargan over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should also not be rejected for the 
instruments to be valid. In essence, the Sargan (Hansen) test which is based on homoscedasticity 
(heteroscedasticity) is not robust (robust) but not weakened (weakened) by instruments. In order 
to avoid instrument proliferation, the specifications are tailored such that the number of cross 
sections is higher than the corresponding number of instruments. Third, the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments is also employed to further assess the validity of 
the Hansen OIR. Fourth, the joint validity of estimated coefficients is examined with the Fisher 
test.  
 Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present findings corresponding to financial 
activity, financial efficiency and liquid liabilities. Three main findings are articulated, namely: 
the marginal effects, net impacts of ICT and thresholds at which the marginal effects of ICT can 
completely change the sign of the unconditional ISO impact. Moreover, for an ICT threshold to 
have economic meaning, it must be within the range provided by the summary statistics. For 
instance, in the first specification of Table 1: (i) the marginal effect of mobile phones on PCR for 
banking system activity is 0.0009; (ii) the corresponding net effect is -0.129([36.659 ×0.0009] + 
-0.162)
5
 and (iii) the threshold at which the positive marginal effects changes the unconditional 
negative effect of PCR (-0.162) from negative to positive is 180 (0.162/0.0009). Unfortunately, 
the positive threshold is not within the mobile phone range (0.214 to 171.51) disclosed by the 
summary statistics.  
   
                                                          
5
 36.659 is the mean value of mobile phone penetration.  
 13 
 
Table 1: Financial Activity, Mobile Phones and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Dependent Variable  Financial Activity 
         
 Banking System Activity  Financial System Activity  
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -4.008*** -1.086 -1.856 -1.392** -1.583 0.383 0.364 -0.974 
 (0.000) (0.145) (0.129) (0.028) (0.227) (0.722) (0.780) (0.150) 
Banking System  Activity (-1) 1.135*** 1.089*** 1.154*** 1.046*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Financial System Activity (-1) --- --- --- --- 1.114*** 1.122*** 1.182*** 1.061*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.162*** --- -0.158*** --- -0.175*** --- -0.132*** --- 
 (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.000)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.014 --- 0.028** --- 0.017 --- 0.051*** 
  (0.287)  (0.018)  (0.251)  (0.000) 
Mobile Phones  -0.043*** -0.019** --- --- -0.029** -0.021** --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.021)   (0.022) (0.043)   
Internet  --- --- -0.198*** -0.015 --- --- -0.259*** -0.010 
   (0.000) (0.293)   (0.000) (0.348) 
PCR*Mobile Phones 0.0009** --- --- --- 0.001*** --- --- --- 
 (0.046)    (0.007)    
PCB*Mobile Phones --- -0.0005*** --- --- --- -0.001*** --- --- 
  (0.000)    (0.000)   
PCR*Internet --- --- 0.003** --- --- --- 0.003*** --- 
   (0.011)    (0.000)  
PCB*Internet --- --- --- -0.006*** --- --- --- -0.008*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.071** 0.048** 0.055*** 0.024 0.029 0.049* 0.017 -0.010 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.009) (0.211) (0.459) (0.057) (0.560) (0.600) 
Inflation -0.020 -0.021* -0.012 -0.017*** -0.021 -0.027 -0.024 -0.030** 
 (0.201) (0.059) (0.389) (0.000) (0.284) (0.130) (0.372) (0.017) 
Public Investment  0.147*** 0.066*** 0.081*** 0.024 0.153*** 0.092*** 0.126*** 0.025 
 (0.000) (0.005) (0.007) (0.181) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.215) 
Foreign Aid  0.010 0.001 0.047 0.064*** -0.013 -0.052* -0.055* 0.081*** 
 (0.637) (0.959) (0.145) (0.003) (0.597) (0.057) (0.070) (0.001) 
Trade  0.017 0.014*** 0.014 0.020*** -0.002 -0.006 -0.032** 0.009 
 (0.159) (0.003) (0.322) (0.004) (0.812) (0.446) (0.024) (0.218) 
         
Net Effect of Mobile Phones -0.129 -0.004 --- --- -0.138 -0.019 --- --- 
Net Effect of  Internet  --- --- -0.137 -0.012 --- --- -0.111 na 
Thresholds (-/+) 180 -28 52.66 -4.66 175 -17 44 na 
         
AR(1) (0.021) (0.008) (0.034) (0.003) (0.091) (0.025) (0.185) (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.298) (0.201) (0.402) (0.196) (0.115) (0.119) (0.164) (0.088) 
Sargan OIR (0.028) (0.009) (0.042) (0.000) (0.006) (0.010) (0.204) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.432) (0.388) (0.266) (0.205) (0.402) (0.335) (0.570) (0.206) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.167) (0.070) (0.224) (0.089) (0.049) (0.036) (0.381) (0.123) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.675) (0.806) (0.368) (0.468) (0.879) (0.859) (0.627) (0.401) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.330) (0.220) (0.498) (0.499) (0.234) (0.133) (0.419) (0.410) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.618) (0.814) (0.102) (0.058) (0.805) (0.958) (0.740) (0.096) 
         
Fisher  2657.72*** 43729.6*** 28165.3*** 45640.8*** 8277.50*** 225087*** 62262*** 146109*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  259 259 255 255 261 261 257 257 
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*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.   
 
The following findings can be established for Table 1. First, marginal effects from 
interactions between ICT and PCR (PCB) are consistently positive (negative). Second, net 
effects from interactions between ICT and ISO are negative with a higher magnitude from 
interactions with PCR. Third, only thresholds corresponding to interactions between PCR and 
internet penetration are within range, notably:  52. 66 and 44 respectively for ‘banking system 
activity’ and ‘financial system activity’. Fourth, the significant control variables have expected 
signs.  
 In Table 2 on financial efficiency regressions, the following can be established. First, on 
the interaction between mobile phones and PCR, the: marginal effect is positive (0.003), net 
effect is positive (0.005) and positive threshold (34.66) is within range (0.214 to 171.51).  
Second, the control variables are significant with the expected signs. Given that the findings on 
financial allocation efficiency are less significant compared to those on financial activity, we 
attempt to elicit this insignificance by further assessing the role of ICT in ISO for financial 
system deposits. This is to verify if the unsatisfactory findings from financial efficiency may be 
the result of ICT also reducing information asymmetry to increase financial system deposits 
(liquid liabilities). To this end, results from Table 3 broadly confirm this intuition because: the 
marginal effect of mobile phone penetration on PCR is positive whereas the net effects of ICT on 
PCB are positive. It follows that financial allocation efficiency may also be constrained by the 
increasing financial system deposits.  In other words, the interaction between ICT and ISO for 
allocation efficiency may be constrained by increasing financial system deposits. Most of the 
control variables in Tables 2-3 are significant with the expected signs because the three 
dependent variables are by conception and definition conflicting because the dependent variable 
in Table 2 (allocation efficiency) is the ability of the dependent variable in Table 3 (financial 
deposit) to be transformed into the dependent variable in Table 1 (financial credit).  
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Table 2: Banking Efficiency, Mobile Phones and Information Asymmetry   
         
 Dependent Variable : Financial Efficiency 
         
 Banking System Efficiency Financial System Efficiency 
 Mobile Phones Internet Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  31.170*** 28.316*** 16.790*** 25.551*** 8.360*** -2.190 13.057*** 0.606 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) (0.363) (0.000) (0.838) 
Banking System Efficiency (-1) 0.719*** 0.774*** 0.798*** 0.785*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Financial System Efficiency (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.854*** 0.972*** 0.793*** 0.948*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.104 --- -0.055 --- -0.109 --- -0.236** --- 
 (0.543)  (0.808)  (0.286)  (0.023)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- -0.054 --- -0.203*** --- -0.078*** --- -0.165*** 
  (0.655)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Mobile Phones  -0.081** -0.002 --- --- -0.021 -0.036* --- --- 
 (0.011) (0.956)   (0.175) (0.053)   
Internet  --- --- -0.129 -0.091 --- --- 0.083 -0.011 
   (0.159) (0.399)   (0.186) (0.857) 
PCR*Mobile Phones 0.003** --- --- --- 0.001 --- --- --- 
 (0.048)    (0.119)    
PCB*Mobile Phones --- -0.0001 --- --- --- 0.0004 --- --- 
  (0.911)    (0.130)   
PCR*Internet --- --- 0.007 --- --- --- 0.010*** --- 
   (0.344)    (0.008)  
PCB*Internet --- --- --- 0.007 --- --- --- 0.008*** 
    (0.191)    (0.000) 
GDP growth  0.536*** 0.390*** 0.499*** 0.605*** 0.636*** 0.650*** 0.489*** 0.609*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation 0.0005*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.041 -0.042 0.019 -0.038 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.459) (0.303) (0.773) (0.483) 
Public Investment  -0.311*** -0.375*** -0.290** -0.479*** -0.031 0.095 -0.021 0.053 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.653) (0.213) (0.791) (0.483) 
Foreign Aid  -0.350*** -0.375*** -0.336*** -0.491*** -0.138** -0.093 -0.111 0.032 
 (0.000) (0.006) (0.003) (0.000) (0.015) (0.0113) (0.146) (0.349) 
Trade  -0.00004 -0.039 0.058* 0.007 0.046 0.044 0.022 0.035 
 (0.999) (0.317) (0.097) (0.791) (0.169) (0.148) (0.478) (0.349) 
         
Net Effect of Mobile Phones 0.005 na --- --- na na --- --- 
Net Effect of  Internet  --- --- na na --- --- na na 
Thresholds (-/+) 34.66 na na na na na na na 
         
AR(1) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.137) (0.093) (0.156) (0.102) 
AR(2) (0.135) (0.153) (0.087) (0.125) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021) (0.018) 
Sargan OIR (0.221) (0.033) (0.266) (0.325) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.474) (0.344) (0.749) (0.219) (0.215) (0.251) (0.278) (0.311) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.768) (0.530) (0.581) (0.570) (0.409) (0.262) (0.397) (0.312) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.280) (0.265) (0.712) (0.135) (0.184) (0.313) (0.260) (0.355) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.713) (0.364) (0.554) (0.455) (0.245) (0.137) (0.557) (0.168) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.140) (0.347) (0.877) (0.085) (0.282) (0.735) (0.083) (0.790) 
         
Fisher  6887.33*** 6566.06*** 7684.16*** 1873.05*** 1351.21*** 59825.5*** 558.27*** 68898.6*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Observations  266 266 262 262 259 259 255 255 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Table 3 : Liquid liabilities, Mobile Phones and Information Asymmetry   
     
 Dependent Variable : Financial System Deposits (Liquid Liabilities)  
 Mobile Phones Internet 
 PCR PCB PCR PCB 
Constant  -2.415 -4.324** -1.386* -1.838 
 (0.126) (0.014) (0.072) (0.140) 
Liquid Liabilities  (-1) 1.093*** 1.016*** 1.075*** 1.061*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.348*** --- -0.113*** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.008)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.082*** --- 0.084*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Mobile Phones  -0.023* 0.011 --- --- 
 (0.060) (0.269)   
Internet  --- --- -0.104*** -0.090*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR*Mobile Phones 0.001*** --- --- --- 
 (0.002)    
PCB*Mobile Phones --- -0.0009***  --- 
  (0.000) ---  
PCR*Internet --- --- -0.0003 --- 
   (0.819)  
PCB*Internet --- --- --- -0.005*** 
    (0.000) 
GDP growth  -0.059** -0.081*** -0.099*** -0.102*** 
 (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Inflation -0.017 0.0006 -0.018** -0.019* 
 (0.324) (0.935) (0.023) (0.078) 
Public Investment  0.107*** 0.008 0.0009 -0.018 
 (0.000) (0.721) (0.968) (0.372) 
Foreign Aid  0.029 0.101** 0.034 0.084* 
 (0.346) (0.011) (0.211) (0.057) 
Trade  0.026 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.026** 
 (0.100) (0.003) (0.000) (0.021) 
     
Net Effect of Mobile Phones -0.311 0.049 --- --- 
Net Effect of  Internet  --- --- na 0.049 
Thresholds (-/+) 348 -91.11 na -16.80 
     
AR(1) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.544) (0.388) (0.650) (0.344) 
Sargan OIR (0.038) (0.004) (0.056) (0.056) 
Hansen OIR (0.541) (0.558) (0.415) (0.185) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.414) (0.091) (0.119) (0.029) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.565) (0.917) (0.733) (0.668) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.739) (0.414) (0.459) (0.368) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.180) (0.724) (0.330) (0.099) 
     
Fisher  2098.91*** 9750.14*** 42993.22*** 57432.6*** 
Instruments  41 41 41 41 
Countries  45 45 45 45 
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Observations  259 259 255 255 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients, 
Hausman test and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and implications 
 Established results are further discussed in two main strands, namely, implications for: 
theory and practice.  
 
4.2.1 Implications for theory  
 Given that findings related to financial efficiency are not overwhelmingly significant; 
implications for theory are fundamentally related to the negative net impacts of interactions on 
financial activity.  This implies that the net effect of the interaction between ICT and ISO on the 
allocation of credit is negative, for the most part. Hence, it is reasonable to infer that the ‘quiet of 
life hypothesis’ (QLH) may be enjoyed by banking institutions (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
In essence, the QLH postulates that banks with substantial advantages would dedicate less effort 
towards pursuing objectives of financial access. Instead, they would prefer to instrument the 
underlying advantages to increasing their gains and enjoying a ‘quiet life’ instead of increasing 
financial access to borrowers.  
 In the light of consistent negative net effects, we can be tempted to infer that African 
financial institutions are taking advantage of the burgeoning ICT and ISO to improve their profit 
margins instead of increasing financial access. Hence, we may also infer that the ISO are not 
fulfilling their theoretical mission of helping financial institutions to increase credit allocation. 
This is specifically because, ISO should reduce information rents linked to the high credit cost 
and ICT is instrumental in the provision and diffusion of information. Given that ISO are 
fundamentally relevant in checking the abuse of market power by big banks and that ‘quality of 
life’ is related to banks with market power for the most part, it is also reasonable to infer that the 
advent of ISO and ICT have not been accompanied with increased market competition in the 
banking industry. In summary, the nexus between ISO and ICT may not be garnering anticipated 
financial access externalities because the interaction is yet to counteract the weight of powerful 
banks by, amongst others, sharing information to: boost competition, reduce rents in the 
information market and increase the contestability of credit markets (see Pagano & Jappelli, 
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1993, p. 2019).  As an implication, it would be worthwhile for policy to tailor the nexus between 
ISO and ICT towards improving competition in the financial environment and limiting the 
domination of powerful banks.  
 It is important to extend the above discourse with possible inherent issues of: (i) moral 
hazard from bank customers and (ii) the nexus between ISO and ICT as a disciplinary 
mechanism for borrowers. This interpretation is relevant in the perspective that the sharing of 
information by ISO with help of ICT is not resulting in a net positive effect in terms of the 
allocation of credit because of fundamental moral hazard concerns on the part of borrowers. In 
essence, even if ISO and ICT contribute to completely mitigating information rents that banks 
previously enjoyed, banks may still be very unwilling to increase financial access if they are not 
convinced that a higher repayment probability would result from information provided by the 
association between ICT and ISO. This line of interpretation is fundamentally because ISO play 
an essential mission as a ‘discipline instrument’ on the part of borrowers by reducing moral 
hazard and providing them with performance incentives. Hence, as a policy implication, 
measures underlying the association between ISO and ICT for better financial access should be 
tailored with the hypothesis that, information provided as a result of the association between ICT 
and ISO may not be effective at increasing borrowers’ discipline and reducing moral hazard, 
because of inter alia: rampant corrupt lending; recourse to informal financial mechanisms by 
borrowers and borrowers unafraid of losing their reputation.  
 
4.2.2 Implications for practice  
 The fundamental practical implication of this study is that the nexus between ISO and 
ICT is yet not sufficient to fight the substantially documented concerns of surplus liquidity in 
African financial institutions. The existing complementarity between ISO and ICT would benefit 
from enhance information synchronisation and more qualified personal through inter alia: 
‘knowledge economy’ (KE)-driven economic policies; regular training of ISO staff; reliable 
high-speed access to the internet and instrumentation of mobile banking services. These 
improvements would help in consolidating the fight against the voluntary and involuntary 
holding of excess liquidity. First, the discussed instruments could be used to reduce involuntary 
holding of cash via, inter alia: reduction of the inability of banks to lend when interest rates are 
regulated; ease investment in bond markets by banks; augment competition in lending between 
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banks and enlarge opportunities so that financial institutions invest in regional stock markets. 
Second, underlying instruments can also be used to limit voluntary holding of excess cash by, 
inter alia: easing constraints banks face when updating their status’ at the level of central banks 
in order to prevent them from keeping reserves above statutory thresholds; facilitating 
contingency-related interbank lending and overcoming concerns about transportation that may 
constraint financial institutions in remote geographic areas to keep excess cash.  
 
5. Conclusion and future directions 
This study has assessed the role of information and communication technology (ICT) in 
complementing private credit bureaus (PCB) and public credit registries (PCR) in reducing 
information asymmetry for financial access and allocation efficiency. The empirical evidence is 
based on GMM with 53 African countries for the period 2004-2011. The following findings have 
been established. First on financial access: (i) the marginal effects from the interaction between 
ICT and PCR (PCB) are consistently positive (negative); (ii) net effects from interactions 
between ICT and credit offices are negative with a higher magnitude from interactions with PCR 
and (iii) only thresholds corresponding to interactions between PCR and internet penetration are 
within range. Second, findings on financial allocation efficiency reveal positive marginal and net 
effects exclusively for mobile phones and PCR. Third, allocation efficiency may be constrained 
by increasing financial system deposits. Overall, the complementarity between information 
sharing offices and ICT in boosting financial access is still very limited. Policy implications have 
been discussed in the light of improving the complementary role of ICT in the mission of ISO 
and fighting surplus liquidity. 
Future research could focus on examining the complementarity of ISO and ICT 
throughout the conditional distribution of financial access variables. The policy relevance of this 
approach is that dynamics of the engaged complementarity may be contingent on initial levels of 
financial access.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics (2004-2011) 
  
 Variables Mean S.D Min. Max. Observations 
       
 
Financial 
Access  
Financial System Depth (Fdgdp) 28.262 21.066 2.926 92.325 377 
Banking  System Efficiency (BcBd)  68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Financial System Efficiency (FcFd) 68.118 27.725 14.804 171.85 402 
Banking System Activity (Pcrb) 72.722 35.884 22.200 252.88 377 
Financial System Activity (Pcrbof) 21.571 24.154 0.010 149.77 379 
       
ICT Mobile Phone Penetration   36.659 32.848 0.214 171.51 420 
Internet Penetration  6.822 8.852 0.031 51.00 414 
       
Information 
Asymmetry   
Public Credit registries (PCR) 2.155 5.812 0 49.8 381 
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) 4.223 13.734 0 64.8 380 
       
 
Control 
Variables 
Economic Prosperity (GDPg) 4.996 4.556 -17.66 37.998 404 
Inflation 7.801 4.720   0 43.011 357 
Public Investment 74.778 1241.70 -8.974 24411 387 
Development Assistance  10.396 12.958 0.027 147.05 411 
Trade Openness (Trade) 80.861 32.935 24.968 186.15 392 
       
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.. Fdgdp: Financial deposits(liquid liabilities). BcBd: Bank credit on Bank deposits. 
FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks. Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks 
and other financial institutions. GDPg: GDP growth.  
.  
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        Appendix 2: Correlation Analysis (Uniform sample size : 291) 
            
Financial Access  Info. Asymmetry ICT Other variables  
Deposits Financial Efficiency Financial Activity          
Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Prcb Pcrbof PCR PCB Mobile Internet GDPg Inflation PubIvt NODA Trade  
1.000 0.114 0.199 0.879 0.750 0.386 0.281 0.469 0.727 -0.100 -0.059 0.055 -0.281 0.130 Fdgdp 
 1.000 0.859 0.490 0.495 0.154 0.303 0.117 0.140 -0.016 -0.144 -0.169 -0.133 -0.176 Bcbd 
  1.000 0.583 0.743 0.067 0.510 0.224 0.149 -0.056 -0.097 -0.149 -0.179 -0.189 FcFd 
   1.000 0.922 0.448 0.439 0.523 0.707 -0.092 -0.089 -0.055 -0.343 0.093 Pcrb 
    1.000 0.293 0.556 0.495 0.558 -0.088 -0.073 -0.057 -0.324 0.019 Pcrbof 
     1.000 -0.140 0.360 0.428 -0.026 -0.081 0.068 -0.154 0.207 PCR 
      1.000 0.399 0.157 -0.101 -0.035 -0.047 -0.329 0.084 PCB 
       1.000 0.629 -0.192 -0.136 0.088 -0.496 0.195 Mobile 
        1.000 -0.082 -0.025 -0.024 -0.373 0.117 Internet 
         1.000 -0.169 0.129 0.122 0.037 GDPg 
          1.000 -0.081 -0.0004 -0.006 Inflation  
           1.000 0.059 0.130 PubIvt 
            1.000 -0.309 NODA 
             1.000 Trade 
               
          Fdgdp: Financial system deposits. . BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from deposit banks.  Pcrbof: Private domestic  
          credit    from deposit banks and other financial institutions. Info: Information. PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. ICT: Information and Communication Technology.  Mobile:   
          Mobile Phone Penetration. Internet: Internet Penetration.  GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: Population growth. PubIvt: Public Investment. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. Info: Information.  
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Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Financial System Deposits  Fdgdp Liquid Liabilities (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking System Efficiency   BcBd Bank credit on Bank deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Efficiency   FcFd Financial credit on Financial deposits World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Banking  System Activity  Prcb Private domestic credit from deposit banks (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Financial System Activity Prcbof Private domestic credit from financial institutions (% of GDP) World Bank (FDSD) 
    
Information Asymmetry  PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
   
PCB Private credit bureau coverage (% of adults) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Information and 
Communication Technology 
Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Internet Internet penetration  (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP Growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation  Infl Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Public Investment   PubIvt Gross Public Investment (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Development Assistance    NODA Total Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP)  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade openness  Trade Imports plus Exports in commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database.  
 
Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
      
 Deposits  Financial Efficiency  Financial Activity  
 Fdgdp BcBd FcFd Pcrd Pcrdof 
Fdgdp(-1) 0.990     
BcBd(-1)  0.9438    
FcFd(-1)   0.9815   
Pcrd (-1)    0.9919  
Pcrdof(-1)     0.9945 
      
BcBd: Bank credit on bank deposits. FcFd: Financial credit on Financial deposits. Pcrb: Private domestic credit from  deposit banks.  
Pcrbof: Private domestic credit from deposit banks and other financial institutions.. Fdgdp(-1): Lagged value of Financial system deposits.  
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